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Honor, Reputation, and Reciprocity
Leslie Peirce
1 Honor in its  usage today,  in  English at  least,  is  typically  defined by its  constituent
attributes: Dicitonary.com defines it as “honesty, fairness, or integrity in one’s beliefs
and actions”. Reputation on the other hand is a relational concept: “the estimation in
which a person or thing is held, especially by the community or the public generally”.
It takes the community to bestow or deny good reputation. 
2 Explicit terms for honor do not often occur in Ottoman sources from the sixteenth and
first  half  of  the seventeenth century,  the  period I  am interested in.  When they do
appear, it is the familiar terms `ırz and namus.1 It seems somewhat risky, therefore, to
use the word “honor” in talking about sensibilities and motivations in this period, at
least without working from the ground up to observe how honor was conceived and
deployed. On the other hand, reputation was palpably present, if not so labeled, in the
talk and action of Ottoman subjects—as was the effort to maintain it, or to damage that
of another person. To put this another way, looking at reputation and how one gained a
good or bad one is arguably the most productive avenue for understanding how people
in early modern Ottoman times understood honor. 
3 This essay nevertheless employs the terms “honor” and “dishonor”. The reader should
be thinking of them, however, as embedded in a relational process where one person’s
gain may spell  another’s  loss,  or  there may be an attempt to maintain equilibrium
among individuals, that is, to recoup damaged reputations for all parties involved in a
troubled situation. A person who has been dishonored by the action of another may or
may not suffer diminished reputation, depending upon how he or she reacts to the
insult.  Studying  honor  as  a  relational  phenomenon—the  process  of  censuring  or
validating a person or group’s actions or inactions—allows us to appreciate the capacity
of  Ottoman  subjects  to  talk  to  each  other  about  honor,  and  also,  importantly,  of
Ottoman authorities and subjects to employ the language of honor to communicate
about broader problems. 
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The vocabulary and rhetoric of honor
4 Ordinary  individuals  thought  and  spoke  about  honor  and  dishonor  in  a  variety  of
verbal registers. Let us examine some texts that suggest some of the ways they did so
and some of the situations that propelled them to speak. The first set of examples is
drawn from the court records of Aintab (today’s Gaziantep) for the years 1540-1541 and
of Harput (Elazığ) for 1630-1631. Ottoman courts acted as not only as judicial forums in
which  Islamic  Sharia  and  Ottoman  sultanic  law  (kanun)  were  enforced  but  also  as
resources for members of the community, who regularly used their local court to air
personal problems or disputes on their own initiative. 
5 When the little daughter of Muhsin threw stones at the house of Haci Mansur, both
residents of the provincial capital of Aintab, Mansur responded by attacking Muhsin
both physically  and verbally.  He grabbed Muhsin’s  beard and yelled,  “Aren’t  you a
man? Why do you bother wearing a turban? Discipline your daughter!”2 Mansur had
invaded two bodily zones of  male honor,  the beard and the head covering.  Muhsin
found the insult unacceptable, it seems, since he took the trouble of having Mansur’s
words and deed recorded at court (it took two efforts to induce Mansur to make the
complete statement above). In the end, each man made his point in a public manner.
6 Because what people said to and of one another could be actionable, court registers of
this period are replete with the direct quotation of litigants’ speech. Testimony was
almost always recorded in the Turkish past tense employed for eye or ear witness—dedi,
“he said (and I know because I was there)”—rather than in the past tense that implied
second-hand knowledge—demiş, “he said (or that is what I am given to understand)”.
Litigants of course might mumble or verbally stumble in court, requiring judges and
scribes to rephrase less than articulate speech. But in cases like that of Mansur, where
what  was  said  might  have  legal  consequences,  they  strove  when  recording  direct
speech to remain as faithful as possible to the diction and word choice of the speaker.
They needed to get it  right,  as there was always the possibility that a court record
might be revisited for evidence in a future dispute.
7 The next case preserves the words of the most assertive young woman ever to emerge
in the court  registers  I  have read.  The daughter of  one Haci  Mustafa,  Fatma was a
resident of the eastern Anatolian city of Harput. The crux of the case is her engagement
to a certain Mevlut. He has given her the required dower or part of it at least. But six
years have passed and no marriage has taken place.  Moreover,  Mevlut has married
someone else. What brings it all to a head in 1631 is unclear, although what is clear is
the  discord  between Fatma and her  father.  Apparently  he  has  confined  her  to  the
house, though whether he has physically tied her down is unclear (her reference below
to her immobility may be metaphorical). In the courtyard of the dwelling, she has, in
her  father’s  words,  been  “moaning  and  crying  out”  (feryad  u  efgan)  over  her
unwillingness to marry Mevlut.
8 As a consequence of her confinement, representatives of the court come to Fatma. They
take her testimony as she speaks from the threshold of her house. This is what she says
to them, or at least that part of her statement that the judge considered necessary to
record: 
My father has tied me to the courtyard by my skirt. I am my own agent [başıma
vekilim], and I will not marry Mevlut. I take comfort from my clan and my relatives,
and I appoint Mehmed my agent in this matter [of marriage]. Whomever I consent
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to marry, let that person make a contract of marriage for me. This Mevlut gave me
a linen cap and a box, and not much more.3 
9 It  is  hard to know how old Fatma is,  but given the long engagement,  she could be
twenty or so—that is, an unmarried yet adult female, at risk of not being able to find
another suitor, especially one she would find satisfactory. In other words, if Fatma’s
(dis)honor is  at  stake in this  incident,  it  is  the undesirable alternative between the
socially isolating status of the spinster and settling for being a junior wife. Out of anger,
worry, desperation or all of these, Fatma takes the daring step of asserting her legal
autonomy. She also makes it clear what she thinks of Mevlut’s paltry gifts. 
10 Fatma’s  is  an  audacious  break with  a  father’s  authority.  To  be  sure,  her  refusal  of
Mevlut is legally permissible on the principle that a virgin who has reached majority
(either signs of full puberty or the age of seventeen) can reject the fiancé chosen by her
elders.4 Local  knowledge of  the law was widespread,  and it  was not  uncommon for
young women to use their court to object to matches made by fathers or other male
relatives (see, for example, cases in Ongan 1974). But what is highly unusual in records
of these centuries is Fatma’s open and total rejection of her father’s authority over her
as  her  guardian under  the  law.  Moreover,  Haci  Mustafa’s  restraint  of  his  daughter
appears  to  have  backfired,  for  her  cries  of  abuse  have  presumably  put  the  whole
family’s reputation in jeopardy. 
11 Fatma may not have been alone in her complaints, for a sympathetic member of the
household  has  apparently  enabled  her  to  communicate  with  her  chosen  proxy
Mehmed. Could it be her mother? What she thought about her husband’s actions or her
daughter’s willfulness or what her own stake might be in the troublesome situation is
unknown—perhaps  she  sympathized  with  her  daughter,  or  even  supported  her
resistance. Indeed, the will of mothers is rarely evident in these records. Except in the
case of orphans (children who had lost their father), a mother’s guardianship of her
children was increasingly discouraged by the Ottoman regime. The famed jurist Ebu
Suud,  working in the mid-sixteenth-century,  ruled in his  fatwas that  marriage of  a
female by a guardian other than her father or grandfather had to be sanctioned by the
local judge (Düzdăg 1983: 37-38). This was only one piece of legislation in the program
to tighten up on marriage and sexual morality, a phenomenon that appears to have
been near universal in this period (see, for example, Crawford 2007). In turn, honor and
reputation (as  well  as  the  ability  to  resist  the  state’s  norms)  adjusted to  the  shifts
(Peirce 2010).
12 The last in our set of examples from court records concerns a slander case brought by
Esma,  daughter of  Hoca Hamza,  against  her brother Hamza.  Hamza had apparently
cursed at his sister. “He slandered me by calling me a whore”, Esma alleged before the
judge of Aintab.5 Hamza’s curse was actionable as an instance of false accusation of
adultery. Curses hurled at others were often sexual in nature (calling someone a pimp/
whore/sodomite/fornicator and so on). Should the target of the curse take action to
defend his  or  her reputation,  as  Esma did,  a  potentially  heavy penalty awaited the
slanderer. This does not seem to have stopped people from loose talk, for cursing by
both genders appears to have been a common social habit, at least in parts of early
modern Anatolia.  One  reason for  its  ubiquity  was  that  cursing  and slander  were  a
weapon of  the weak,  a  way to get  one’s  voice heard publicly.  Sometimes,  however,
curses were simply spoken in the heat of anger or frustration, as Hamza’s words appear
to have been.
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13 Esma  lost  her  case.  The  court  noted  that  she  “was  unable  to  supply  the  requisite
number  of  witnesses”  to  Hamza’s  utterance,  and  he  cleared  himself  with  an  oath.
Unlike Fatma’s case, where unknown complexities may lurk behind the pages of the
Harput register, the Aintab register provide clues to family tension among the children
of Hoca Hamza. Two weeks after her suit against her brother, Esma would come to
court  to  use  the  hefty  sum  of  money  she  inherited  from  her  deceased  father  to
purchase her brother Abdulkadir’s share in the house that had been left to him and
Hamza.6 
14 Perhaps it was his sister’s plan to acquire part of the family dwelling that caused Hamza
to curse her. Esma was going against the Aintab norm of sisters yielding the inherited
family dwelling to brothers. Moreover, immediately after acquiring her share of the
house,  the  litigious  Esma  took  her  female  neighbor  to  court  to  demand  structural
alterations in the latter’s house so as to protect her own domestic privacy. Esma, it
seems, was a woman intent on taking care of herself and a legally savvy and active user
of the court. All the more likely, then, that her case against Hamza was taken with full
awareness of the price she might pay to make his slander public. Reputation could be
worth more than money, and Esma apparently had the resources to afford it.
15 Only in the last of these three court cases has the judge’s task been to adjudicate a
lawsuit. In the other two, the court and its personnel have recorded voices in dispute.
Whether the court’s intervention was invited by the disputants or necessitated in the
interest of communal order (we cannot be sure), it has apparently helped to restore
some equilibrium among neighbors or families attacking each other’s integrity. When
we turn to narrative mediums, however,  it  soon becomes evident that authors who
engaged  problems  of  honor  and  reputation  could  more  easily  endow  them  with
tendentious or moralizing rhetoric than could the documentary medium of the court
record. 
16 The two incidents narrated below turn on the public dishonor of an entire community.
One is  drawn from the history  of  the  seventeenth-century author  and government
servant Ibrahim Peçevi. The second is from the Register of Important Affairs (Mühimme
Defteri),  in  which  the  sultan’s  Imperial  Council  recorded  petitions  from  across  the
empire and its  responses  to  them.  Both texts  are  indirect  critiques  of  the weak or
incompetent government that prevailed during the 1620s and the early 1630s (Fatma’s
Harput  was  also  experiencing  disorder  at  the  time).  Both  employ  stories  of  the
dishonoring of women to make the point about the sultanate’s inability to protect the
honor of its subjects. 
17 Peçevi related a story that took place in Tokat, winter headquarters of the Ottoman
army  during  its  eastern  campaigns.  The  sorry  tale,  which  he  heard  first  hand,
concerned the daughter of a poor peasant. The father had been forced to sell her to the
village grandee in order to pay off debts incurred by the financial burdens imposed by
the latter. The grandee then proceeded to auction the girl off in the streets of Tokat.
Peçevi deplored the fact that this could happen at a time when the grand vizier, the
Janissary commander,  and the commanders  of  the imperial  cavalry troops were all
resident in Tokat. “Things had come to such a pass,” commented the historian, “that
even with so many great men in the city supposedly keeping order, not a one prevented
this or was capable even of speaking out against it.”7 Cities were thought to be entities
with character, and any reputation Tokat may have had as a place where the sultan’s
justice prevailed was tarnished.
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18 The incident narrated in the Imperial Council’s Register echoed Peçevi’s implication
that delegates of the sultan’s authority were powerless because he was powerless—or,
just  as  bad,  negligent.  As  a  consequence,  local  communities  lacked  resources  to
preserve the good reputation of their citizens. The first victim to be dishonored in this
incident, which took place in 1630 in Göynük, a town near Bursa, was Emine, the wife of
a judge, Mevlana Mustafa. The second was the judge himself. What had happened was
that Mevlana Mustafa called in a loan of 50,000 silver coins from a certain Hüseyin. The
latter responded by abducting Emine. He then handed her over to one of his followers
“to use” (for sex). 
19 The incident was relayed to the Imperial Council in Istanbul in a petition authored by
the  head  judge  of  Göynük,  Mevlana  Abdulaziz.  His  purpose  was  to  appeal  to  the
government to send forces against the man he described as a bandit captain of a gang
of forty. This was not a case of litigation where a judge had to remain neutral,  but
rather a complaint whose rhetoric was carefully crafted to chide the sultan’s viziers, if
implicitly,  for  the  disorder  then  rampant  in  parts  of  Anatolia.  Mevlana  Abdulaziz
pointedly  noted  that  “not  one  of  the  leading  men  of  the  province  was  capable  of
rescuing her”.8 The dishonor of Emine, the judge Mevlana Mustafa,  and the hapless
dignitaries of the province, like that of the Tokat protagonists, was the dishonor of the
state.  The sultanate  had failed  its  subjects  by  its  inability  to  uphold the  unwritten
constitution of the empire—royal protection in exchange for loyal allegiance. It was a
dismal commentary on the times, for the essential contract of empire appeared to be
broken. 
 
Reciprocity and the social contract
20 I  would  like  to  borrow  from  the  vocabulary  of  European  thought  to  approach  the
question  of  reciprocity  and  the  goal  of  equilibrium  in  the  quest  for  honor  and
reputation. The idea to consider honor as a social contract was suggested by an NYU
graduate student who linked the two phenomena in a paper responding to a set of
readings on the theme “honor and the state”; it seemed a productive idea to think with.
9 The term “social contract” of course has a long history in European thought. It is not
my purpose to impose the term on Ottoman dynamics but rather to use it as an entrée
into thinking about the contractual habits of early modern Ottoman communities.
21 The many Ottoman intellectuals interested in law and government would have found
much to recognize in Hugo Grotius’ De Jure Belli  ac Pacis (On the law/rights of war and
peace), or at least in its prolegomena. Here, the profoundly influential Dutch thinker
lays out the foundation of his case for international law. I cite from this particular work
because it appeared in the period considered here (1625), in advance of Enlightenment
thinking, and because Grotius recognizes the power of “custom and tacit compact”, so
integral to the mentality of the subjects of the Ottoman empire. “The mother of right—
that is of natural law [jus]—is human nature;” he says, “for this would lead us to desire
mutual society, even if it  were not required for the supply of other wants. And the
mother of civil laws is obligation by mutual compact.” Like the Ottomans, Grotius does
not leave all up to humankind. He is concerned to reconcile natural law with “sacred
history”: it is God who authors jus in humans (Hugo Grotius 1902).
22 Contractual practices were embedded in the socio-legal culture of the early modern
Ottoman world. In addition to the expected—property sale, purchase, rental and loan
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contracts—were  engagement  and  marriage  (among  Muslims  not  a  sacrament  but  a
formal  contract),  and  one  might  add  divorce,  with  its  entailment  of  agreements
regarding financial support and custody. In theory at least, the ideal of just exchange
imbued  contracts  with  more  than  an  instrumental  function.  All  contracts  had
witnesses, who, if necessary in the future, could supply the testimony that Islamic law
regarded as the bedrock of the legal process. 
23 Trust  in  mediation  was  implicit  in  the  Ottoman  social  contract.  The  widespread
practice of sulh—settling disputes by the arbitration of neutral parties—could involve
up to four parties to achieve the compact of reconciliation: the two disputant parties,
the arbiters, and the judge, who oversaw and sanctioned the final agreement. In the
court records I have studied, sulh cases are the sole locus of overt religious reference:
they were sometimes recorded along with the hadith “el-sulh hayırdır” (“peacemaking is
a  benefaction”).  Perhaps  the  hadith  enshrined  the  Prophet  Muhammad’s  original
communal function as an arbiter (hakim). Respect for sulh was further enshrined in the
custom of calling arbiters musalihun, “peace-makers”, or “Muslims”, meaning morally
upright men.10
24 “Contractualism”  may  not  fit  all  habits  that  bound people  together  in  this  period,
willingly or not. “Mutualities” may be a better way to think about some. The term hak—
one’s share, right, or due justice—was not uncommonly asserted at the courts of judges,
suggesting that individuals expected, ideally, to be treated fairly, by others, by the law,
and  by  the  state.  Another  common  practice  that  drew  people  into  a  bonded
relationship was kefalet, mutual guarantorship—that is, the act of appointing or acting
as guarantor or surety for another’s  whereabouts,  debts,  or crimes.  The practice of
kefalet has been attested for early modern Bulgarian towns, Istanbul, and Jerusalem
(Ivanova 1990; Abou-El-Haj 201311).
25 Here is the record of the kefalet formed by six Armenian men of Aintab before the judge.
They  acted  on  behalf  of  the  whole  Armenian  population  of  the  city  as  well  as
Armenians in the general region: 
If any harm or damage is done by any Armenian from our district, we collectively
assume responsibility for it. And we assume responsibility for those [Armenians]
who come among us, those from outside. Henceforth if anything contrary is done
by any of our community, hold [the six of] us accountable.12 
26 The specific impetus for this oath of unity was probably an investigation one week
earlier  by  the  local  governor’s  men  into  a  crime  allegedly  committed  within  the
Armenian community five years earlier (the murder of a convert to Islam whose corpse
had just been exposed). It was time to unite defensively.
27 If  hak  could  be  an  adversarial  reciprocity,  a  claim  to  one’s  own  due,  kefalet  was  a
consolidating reciprocity. The pledge of mutual support was a resource often called
upon in circumstances of threat or insecurity. Within the space of one week in June
1541 in the city of Aintab, the butchers, the bakers, and eight military pensioners came
before  the  judge  to  register  mutual  guarantorships.13 For  each  group,  the  judge
recorded the names of its members and stated that they were now “guarantors and
responsible parties for one another”; for the butchers, he added, “in good times and
bad”. The impetus for this spate of protective initiatives was the departure of a special
agent sent from Istanbul to investigate market practices in Aintab. He had spent most
of his month in the city arraigning several prominent men who were forced to pay back
taxes due to the state. Ordinary individuals who lacked the financial wherewithal that
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the errant city leaders could draw on—butchers, bakers, and retirees, for instance—
protected themselves and their business reputations in mutual compact. 
28 The dynamics of contractualism and mutuality can be attributed to the hundreds of
Ottoman courts operating in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Courts existed
ostensibly for the purpose of implementing the law, that is, educating and inducing the
subject population to conform to the legal regime of the Ottoman state. But they also
served as a notarial bank. People regularly used the judge’s office as a repository for
statements they wanted to have registered, either to publicize things said and/or done
to them or to preserve information for possible retrieval as evidence in the future. (The
technical  term for  this  practice  was  “anticipation of  consequences”.14)  Muhsin may
have had both purposes in mind when he induced Mansur to repeat what he had said
and done in response to the stoning of his house. 
29 The implicit contract between the court and its users comprised the services provided
by the court for the public in exchange for the patronage of the court by the public as a
venue for dispute resolution. It took inducement to make habitual users of the state’s
legal  system  out  of  people  who  before  the  Pax  Ottomanica  may  have  lacked  a
responsible court or indeed any court at all. A relevant Ottoman reform of the court
system was to establish designated courthouses (often, as in Aintab, the residence of
the judge), replacing the use of mosque courtyards, for example, where women and
non-Muslims may have been reluctant—or even unable—to enter.  Each of the three
court cases cited above was, in some degree, an example of the judge’s court not as a
prosecutorial  authority  but  as  a  resource  for  sorting  out  individuals  in  conflict  or
trouble. 
30 All this is not to imply that the Ottoman empire was a self-regulating society or that the
solutions to all problems were negotiated. Force and the sword of justice were liberally
applied by the authorities (including self-appointed authorities such as tribal lords and
the  rebel  pashas  of  the  seventeenth  century).  But  the  pax  Ottomanica  was  a  recent
experience for many communities whose history had more often been one of political
decentralization and contested sovereignty than of sustained rule by a competent and
effective sovereign power. Roy Mottahedeh has eloquently pointed out that some such
communities yearned not to be free but to be ruled, especially the nobles and elders
among  them  (Mottahedeh  1980:  175-6).  In  the  sometimes  long  interstices  between
imperial overlordship, communities were left to their own devices, requiring them to
devise  mechanisms  for  self-regulation.  Aintab  and  Harput  were  places  with  such  a
history.
31 Mottahedeh gives the example of Damascus in the late 10th century as a city in search of
a ruler. The Fatimid governor had fled in the face of Buyid advance, and the ahdath,
gangs of young men, had taken control of the city. The episode is eerily reminiscent of
militias who have recently done the same in Syrian cities that have fallen bereft of any
rational  administration  (Barnard  2013).  My  point  here  is  that  it  did  not  take  the
Ottoman sultanate to introduce the mechanisms for regulating reputation and personal
integrity discussed in this and the next section. The pax Ottomanica, with its power to
enforce decisions and look out for those especially at risk, could of course enable such
mechanisms to work more effectively. But in places like Tokat and Göynük in moments
like the “time of troubles” of the 1620s and 30s, even the state’s officials could prove
powerless. 
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Finding equilibrium 
32 Let us turn now to an incident that casts light on a community’s efforts to avoid a
rupture  over  damaged  reputations.  This  case,  from  the  court  record  of  Aintab  of
1540-1541, revolves around a situation in which two parties in opposition both suffer
personal dishonor.15 It illustrates several dynamics relating to reputation and how it is
constituted—among individuals, between the individual and the community, between
the community  and the authorities  (here,  the government-appointed judge and his
court). 
33 To our eyes, one party—the father-in-law, Mehmed, who has allegedly raped his young
son’s bride—may look suspiciously guilty. The other party—the child bride Ineh, whose
marriage has not yet been consummated—appears to be an innocent victim. But the
court, or rather the mechanisms of the local socio-legal culture, approach the case as
one of double reputations at risk—his because Ineh publicly accuses him of rape, hers
because it is now public knowledge, by her own admission, that she has been sexually
defiled. The outcome of this case is an example of reputational equilibrium—in other
words, the community and the court intervene to salvage some semblance of honor for
all involved. Put another way, the goal is to limit damage to both parties’ standing in
the community. Neither Mehmed nor Ineh is the clear winner or loser in this affair.
34 How does equilibrium come about? There is no proof, no eye witness to the rape; Ineh’s
accusation  is  all  that  there  is.  To  test  the  validity  of  her  allegation,  that  is,  the
likelihood that Mehmed, who denies the rape before the judge, could have done such a
thing,  the  court  holds  an  official  investigation  into  his  reputation  among  the
community. Their consensus is entered into the court record: “When the people of the
village were questioned [about Mehmed], they said: ‘Mehmed has been together with us
from  the  time  we  were  all  children.  We have  never  observed  or  heard  of  any
wrongdoing on his part. We consider his people as friends’.” They know him well, he is
not  a  bad  man,  and  his  whole  family  are  worthy  of  friendship.  Here  is  a  village’s
measure of reputation, in which the integrity of both the individual and the family
count.16 
35 It may seem that Ineh has lost. But reputation is a tricky business in Aintab. It appears
to have been a basic assumption in Ottoman socio-legal culture that reputation was
vital  social  insurance  even for  the  most  obscure  person in  the  community,  a  little
peasant  girl  in  a  remote  village.  Ineh’s  family  is  also  at  risk  of  dishonor,  and it  is
perhaps they who have propelled their daughter to the province’s only court (Ineh’s
step-father in fact is called upon during the exchange of testimony). Why the judge has
allowed Ineh’s testimony to be heard—he had the authority to refuse to hear a case—is
presumably his recognition that damaged reputations in conflict are not good for the
future tranquility of the community. The disposition of social equity, arguably the core
tenet  of  Ottoman  rhetoric  on  just  rule,  acknowledged  that  the  most  powerless  of
individuals was embedded a network of relationships that could permeate the local
geography, and therefore disturb it.
36 Now for the tricky business. Ineh’s accusation may not get Mehmed judged guilty, but
at the same time it does not bode well for him in the long run. As we have seen, people
of the time were charged with archiving memory of an individual’s personal conduct.
Being there, observing, noting, and remembering was apparently an ingrained habit.
Mehmed has now acquired a töhmet, a latent blot on his reputation. If he is accused or
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suspected again, the community will cite this incident, no longer latent, and testify that
“once he was accused of rape”. Going into the court hearing, Mehmed was presumably
töhmetsiz, unblemished in reputation, but now he is töhmetli, a man whose morals may
become suspect in the future. 
37 Testimony  like  that  of  the  villagers  regarding  Mehmed’s  good  reputation  is  not
infrequent  in  the  court  records.  At  least  in  the Aintab region,  there  appears  to  be
regular  reliance  on  the  character  record  of  an  individual  kept  by  neighbors  and
acquaintances. It is more like a pre-criminal record than the criminal record we are
familiar with today. In Aintab, surveillance is not merely a universal habit, it seems, but
a quasi-legal responsibility. Here are two examples of “töhmet-ing” at work: 
• When Canpaşa, a married peasant woman, accuses Hamza of breaking into her house at
night, climbing into her bed, and assaulting her, Hamza denies the accusation. Investigation
among the people of the village shows that he has been similarly accused with regard to
another woman in the village and therefore has a töhmet. Hamza is sentenced to punishment
by the judge.17
• Mezid brings a case against Hüsniye, wife of Şeyhi, saying that when he was staying at their
house,  Hüsniye came to him in bed after Şeyhi had fallen asleep.  Hüsniye’s  character is
investigated, and three men of the city neighborhood testify that “we have never known any
ill  conduct on her part, and we cannot say she is prone to bad behavior.”18 (Note that a
woman could be guilty of sexual aggression. Note also that Mezid is now guilty of slander,
defined as unsubstantiated accusation of sexual misconduct.)
38 The töhmet system, if we can call it that, was most likely a popular response to the strict
evidentiary  rules  of  Sharia.  As  scholars  commonly  recognize,  sexual  crime  (zina)—
adultery, fornication, rape, and sodomy—was hard to prosecute because of the Sharia
requirement  of  four  witnesses  who  had  been  close-up  observers  of  the  deed.
Governments and communities, however, found ways to compensate for the strictness
of Sharia. Ottoman practice tolerated hearsay evidence of adultery and rape, at least in
this period. Slander was another means of airing a sexual offence. People used slander
as a  compensatory weapon of  censure,  for  they were hauled into court  for  making
accusations  that  they  clearly  could  not  substantiate.  When they  did  so,  it  was
apparently because they could alter their target’s reputational standing and hopefully
rehabilitate their own. Presumably, they found it worth risking the heavy penalty for
slander (a fine and/or up to eighty strokes of the bastinado). 
39 Losers could also win, in other words. One might have to break the law, but one might
successfully  assert  one’s  own  moral  innocence  and  rectitude  by  exposing  one’s
antagonist. The woman Hadice is an example. Hadice travelled from Aleppo to Aintab
to accuse one Abdulkadir, scion of an Aintab merchant family, of entering her house in
Aleppo at night and raping her. She was unable to provided witnesses, or at least she
brought none with her on the journey to the Aintab court. Hadice lost her suit when
Abdulkadir took an oath of innocence.19 
40 Why make the trek only to lose the case and presumably pay a hefty fine for sexual
slander? the answer: to accuse Abdulkadir in his own social environment. Hadice’s is
another case involving double reputations at risk. She followed the same strategy as
Ineh did:  create  a  töhmet against  the alleged rapist  and repair  one’s  own honor by
publicizing to kin, neighbors, community that one had resisted the illicit sexual act.
Hadice could presumably purchase a copy of the case record from the Aintab court and
have it inscribed in the register of her neighborhood court in Aleppo (the technical
Honor, Reputation, and Reciprocity
European Journal of Turkish Studies, 18 | 2014
9
term was “transfer of testimony”). Perhaps predictably, women had to work harder to
protect  their  honor,  exposing  sordid  events  to  keep  their  reputations  as  intact  as
possible.  Hadice  of  Aleppo may have  been more  successful  than she  suspected,  for
Abdulkadir,  as  it  turns  out,  was  the  brother  of  Esma  and  Hamza.  Siblings  in  an
apparently quarrelsome family, they may already have acquired a dubious reputation
in their community. 
41 At least in the regions studied here, popular practice made reputation a measurable
phenomenon. The töhmet system allowed local individuals to insert themselves into the
process  of  adjudicating  morals.  It  allowed  females,  more  often  victims  than
perpetrators of humiliating acts, to find a way to tell their side of the story, although
recouping  even a  shred  of  their  tarnished  honor  might  come at  a  literal  cost.  For
chronic abusers, on the other hand, it had the advantage of gradual criminalization:
töhmet was an admonitory as well as a punitive pressure, somewhat akin to the “three
strikes and you’re out” laws that began to proliferate in the U.S. in the 1990s.20 Without
more work in the Ottoman court records and cognate sources, it is hard to say how
many töhmets it took to get one convicted, or whether this mechanism was practiced
across the empire. 
 
Afterthought
42 In writing about Hadice and Ineh, I cannot help but be reminded of the allegation of
rape  in  1991  against  William  Kennedy  Smith,  nephew  of  John,  Robert  and  Edward
Kennedy. Smith was tried and acquitted on a charge of rape in a trial that was national
news. Here are the facts, as relayed by Wikipedia:
The incident began on the evening of Good Friday, March 29, 1991, when Smith, 30
years old, was in a bar in Palm Beach, Florida, with his uncle, Senator Ted Kennedy,
and his cousin Patrick Kennedy. Smith met a 29-year-old woman, Patricia Bowman,
and another  young woman at  the bar.  The four21 then went  to  a  nearby house
owned by the Kennedy family. Smith and the 29-year-old Bowman walked along the
beach.  Bowman  alleged  that  Smith  raped  her;  Smith  testified  that  the  sex  was
consensual. Although three women were willing to testify that Smith had sexually
assaulted them in incidents in the 1980s not reported to the police, their testimony
was excluded. Smith was acquitted of all charges.22 
43 A friend who was then an editor on the national desk at the Washington Post, points
out that “this was a time when the media and the country were just starting to talk
about political leaders' private lives.” Before the Bill Clinton-Monica Lewinsky affair,
she notes, the media generally ignored or repressed reporting that would damage the
reputations  of  the  powerful.  The  exception  was  when  misconduct  “was  flaunted--
Wilbur Mills driving into the Tidal Basin, Gary Hart being photographed with [Donna
Rice] in his lap aboard a boat named Monkey Business. Then it was the men whose
honor was stained: the women were presumed to be prostitutes.”23 
44 Thinking about  Ineh,  Hadice,  and the  three  American women who had not  spoken
publicly about their alleged rape before the Smith trial prompts some questions. How
many females in the early modern Ottoman empire kept silent about their violation, or
were forced to keep silent? And how many females were punished by vigilante justice
for  their  sullied  state?  The  Imperial  Statute  Book  (Kanunnameh-i  Osmanî)  issued  by
Suleyman  I  around  1540  admitted  that  government  authorities  were  not  able  to
suppress the custom of honor killing; it could only attempt to curtail the number of
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scenarios that it would tolerate (Heyd 1973: 59, 98). On the other side of the balance,
something like the töhmet system might have enabled the three U.S. women to have
their testimony count at the 1991 trial. 
45 The William Kennedy Smith trial offers another lesson, namely, that a töhmet may stick
merely  as  a  result  of  the publicity  potential  of  trials.  The Ottoman introduction of
courthouses probably enabled more and different kinds of spectators to watch trials
and other court proceedings (and then go home and gossip about them). Readers of this
essay might now remember the Smith trial, not only because its author remembers and
has cited it here, but also because websites like Wikipedia rake up detritus from the
past, enabling old stories to become fresh fodder for moralizing commentary. On other
hand, the recent career of Bill Clinton has been noteworthy for its exculpatory public
service and appears to have largely rehabilitated his reputation. We can only speculate
whether  their  blemished  reputations  dogged  Ineh,  Mehmed,  and  others  after  their
court appearances or whether scrupulous post-trial  conduct helped to restore their
honor.
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NOTES
1. Late 17th-century definitions in several  vernacular languages as well  as Latin are found in
Meninski 1680: ‘ırz: reputazione, honore, fama, stima (Italian); réputation, honneur, renommée, 
estime (French);  Ruhm, Ehr,  Nam (German);  in reference to women,  ‘ırz  connotes chastity in
Turkish;  nâmûs:  reputazione,  honore,  fama,  dignità,  legge  &  vergogna (Italian);  réputation, 
honneur, renommée, dignité, & honte (French); Ehr, Ruhm, Nam (German).
2. Gaziantep Şeriyye Sicili 2: 132b, c. The Gaziantep and Harput court records (şeriyye sicilleri) are
housed in the Milli Kütüphane (National Library) in Ankara. I thank the Islam Araştırma Merkezi
(Center for Research on Islam) in Istanbul for making a Xerox copy of the Harput court records
available to me.
3. Harput Şeriyye Sicili 181: 4a, b. I thank Hasan Karataş for his help in deciphering this record.
4. In Hanafi jurisprudence, males and females were traditionally considered to arrive at legal
majority (buluğ) when signs of physical maturation were observable; in their absence, buluğ was
the age of fifteen. However, in some 16th-century Ottoman interpretations of Sharia, the age of
maturity was deemed seventeen for females and eighteen for males (for Ebu Suud’s view, see
Düzdağ 1983: 33).
5. Gaziantep Şeriyye Sicili 2: 74b.
6. Ibid., 2: 138b.
7. Ibrahim Peçevi, Tarih-i Peçevi, (Istanbul, 1281-1284/1864-67), 2:402.
8. 85  Numaralı  Mühimme  Defteri  (1040-1041/1630-1631)  [Register  of  Important  Affairs  No.  85,
1630-1631] (Ankara, 2002), Order #381c (3 June 1631), pp. 232-233.
9. I am grateful to Laura Garland for permitting me to adopt her use of social contract.
10. Sulh is discussed further in Chapter 5 of my Morality Tales (2003); kefalet, below, is discussed in
Chapter 7.
11. I thank Rifa‘at Abou-El-Hajj for allowing me to cite his essay.
12. Gaziantep Şeriyye Sicili  161: 173a (“bizim mahallemizden Arameniyâ taifesinden zarar ve ziyan
olursa külliyen kefil olduk diyüb ve bizim aramız[a] gelüb hariçden gelenlere dahi kefil olduk. Ba‘d el-yevm
aramızdan bir muhalef iş olursa, bizden bilin...”).
13. Gaziantep Şeriyye Sicili 2: 50b, 55a, 59c.
14. See Hallaq 1998: 424-425, on the importance of “anticipation of consequences” as a raison
d’être for keeping judicial records.
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15. This episode is discussed at greater length in Peirce 2003b.
16. Note that the villagers do not say we “know” of no harm, but rather employ verbs of primary
(sight) and secondary (hearsay} knowledge, echoing the two past tenses in Turkish.
17. Gaziantep Şeriyye Sicili 161: 28a.
18. Ibid.: 164a.
19. Gaziantep Şeriyye Sicili 2: 231b.
20. On the purposes of criminal law, see White 1985: 192-203.
21. Apparently excluding Senator Kennedy.
22. ‘William Kennedy Smith’ (as of June 6, 2014). I have made minor edits in the Wikipedia text.
23. Personal communication from Joanne Omang, March 14, 2013.
ABSTRACTS
The essay argues that looking at reputation and how one gained a good or bad one is the most
productive avenue for understanding how people in early modern Ottoman times understood
honor. It explores honor and dishonor as relational processes whereby one person’s gain may
spell another’s loss, or there may be an attempt to maintain equilibrium among individuals, that
is, to recoup damaged reputations for all parties involved in a troubled situation. The role of
individuals acting as mediators, witnesses, and guarantors are explored for the ways in which the
community figured in the making or breaking of reputation. Sources drawn upon for the essay
consist primarily of court cases but also include historical writings and petitions submitted to the
sultanate.
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